When I first proposed the theory of multiple intelligences many years ago, one of the most powerful sources of evidence in support of the theory was this fact: injury to different portions of the cortex results in different profiles of strength and weakness. To use the most familiar example, lesions in the middle/medial area of the left cerebral cortex lead to problems with language; while lesions in the posterior regions of the right cerebral cortex lead to problems with spatial processing (these characterizations hold in right-handed persons; the picture with left-handed individuals proves to be more complex). If the brain “assigns” certain functions to specific parts of the brain, this finding suggests that these facets of intellect are or can be dissociated.
Collating evidence for cerebral localization of the understanding of human beings (the personal intelligences) proved to be a greater challenge. Evidence came largely from certain clinical conditions, such as autism, Asperger syndrome, and/or more diffuse damage to the right hemisphere (again, in right-handed persons). And being able to distinguish between understanding of others and understanding of oneself eluded cortical accounts. (Accordingly, in Frames of Mind, I had but a single chapter, entitled “The Personal Intelligences.”) As I have sometimes quipped, only your psychoanalyst knows whether you have a good understanding of yourself.
But this situation may be changing. In an interesting article published recently in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, the authors claim that the ventral portion of the medial prefrontal cortex “has a greater response during the retrieval of self-knowledge than knowledge of others. Moreover, damage to this region has been shown to impair the ability to retrieve self-knowledge while leaving trait knowledge concerning others intact.” The authors go on to speculate that we draw on our self-knowledge in making inference about others—even characters in fiction—to the extent that (we believe) they resemble ourselves.
MI theory is a synthesis of a vast amount of knowledge about human cognition. No single experiment or observation can prove or disprove it. But it is encouraging when research exploring issues quite remote from theories of “intelligence” provides support for claims from the theory.
Citation:
Broom, Timothy W., Robert S. Chavez, Dylan D. Wagner. Becoming the King in the North: identification with fictional characters is associated with greater self–other neural overlap. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. Volume 16, Issue 6, June 2021. Pages 541–551, https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsab021
I thank Branton Shearer for bringing this work to my attention.
Photo by Natasha Connellon Unsplash